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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KEITH II"" , "! i fTT.TiTAMS 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
and Petitioner, 
vs 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, aka 
KEY BANK' OF UTAH, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant and 
Respondent, 
RESPONDENT ,: . .;. : r ' M 
OPPOSITION r^  :-i:.: . 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI: 
No, 890 'ill 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the 'juri u" ^ x e a l - -
dant did not brear - anv dir , i -.---., 
so, does that err-:r - M H S : inj^e 'special 
for grant i,tig cev . -
plaintiff, and, 
i Tiportani. reasons 
Q p I N I Q N Q F T H E COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals decided Williams' appeal as an ex-
~e" • ii ii : J i e r Ru l e 31 :i)f til a 1 lii ] es of l:::l: le • U l::a 1: it, Cc: 
Appeals. After oral argnmen t, the Court: of Appeals enters: ::s 
unpuoILsh*-"
 r l-*~ affir^ip^ ne ^-dgment • - -K.^  -j.str::* :jurt. 
t lorar. t.- \ppendix -^ * - ;:str; c r con rt . * 11 Lng 
by plaintiff's counsel) is attached to Williams' petition as Appen-
dix "B\ 
JURISDICTION 
The decision sought to be reviewed was dated July 12, 
1989, and was filed on July 13, 1989. The jurisdiction of this 
Court is based on sections 78-2-2(3)(a), 78-2-2(5) and 78-2a-4 of 
the Utah Code. 
CONTROLLING RULES AND REGULATIONS 
This case involves Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and 
24 C.F.R. § 203.32(c), the pertinent text of which is set forth 
in the Appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The plaintiff, Keith C. Williams, brought this action 
against Commercial Security Bank ("CSB" or the "Bank"), seeking 
damages for CSB's rejection of his loan application.1 
1
 The plaintiff's legal theories have shifted during the 
course of this litigation. The complaint included two claims for 
relief. The first appeared to be for misrepresentation, and the 
second for negligence. The trial court treated the plaintiff's 
claims as such. Appellant's Petition for Writ of Cert. app. B at 
4 (Record at 137). In the Court of Appeals, the plaintiff charac-
terized his claims as claims for negligence and breach of contract. 
Appellant's Brief at 5. Apparently, the only claim that Williams 
makes before this Court is that the Bank breached "a duty to use 
skill, and diligence in following controlling HUD regulations." 
Petition for Writ of Cert, at iii. 
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B. Course of the Proceedings 
After discovery, CSB moved for summary judgment on both 
of Williams' claims. The trial court granted CSB's motion, and 
Williams appealed. This Court poured the case over to the Court 
of Appeals for disposition. The Court of Appeals set the matter 
for an expedited hearing under Rule 31 .of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. Following the hearing, the Court entered its 
order affirming the judgment of the district court. 
C. Statement of Relevant Facts 
1. At all times relevant to this action, CSB was a 
banking corporation with its principal place of business in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and with a fully operational branch office in 
Price, Carbon County, Utah. Record at 55 I L 2 
2. The Federal Housing Administration ("FHA") is an 
organizational unit within the United States Department of Housing 
and Urban Development ("HUD") that insures certain home mortgages. 
See 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.2 & 200.3 (1988). 
3. Before December 1986, HUD appointed CSB a "direct 
endorsement lender" and qualified Harriet Wilkinson, one of CSB's 
officers, as a "direct endorsement underwriter." As such, CSB 
2 All material facts CSB set forth in its statement of 
facts in support of its motion for summary judgment that Williams 
did not specifically controvert in his memorandum in opposition 
to CSB's motion were deemed admitted. See Rule of Practice in 
the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah 2.8(e) 
(superseded 1989). 
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and Ms. Wilkinson had authority to accept applications for FHA-
insured mortgage loans, to evaluate them and to decide whether 
the loan application met the credit and underwriting standards of 
HUD. Record at 56 1 2. 
4. A direct endorsement underwriter has full, uncondi-
tional authority to determine whether a loan application complies 
with FHA rules and regulations. Deposition of Byron Vaun Bateman 
[hereinafter "Bateman Depo."] at 18. If she concludes that the 
application does, she submits the application to the HUD regional 
office, which then issues an FHA insurance endorsement. Jd. Those 
FHA loan applications that CSB accepted as a direct endorsement 
underwriter were referred to the HUD Region VIII Field Office in 
Salt Lake City. Record at 56 1 2. 
5. FHA regulations in effect in mid-1985 precluded 
FHA approval of a loan application if there was recorded against 
the property a trust deed other than the trust deed securing the 
loan to be insured. Ici. at 56 1 3. 
6. In October 1985, the HUD Region VIII Field Office 
circulated and CSB received a letter dated October 15, 1985, called 
"Circular Letter 14-85," stating that FHA would now insure first 
mortgages on properties for which a second mortgage existed if 
certain conditions were met. One of those conditions was that 
the repayment terms of the second mortgage could not "provide for 
a balloon payment before ten years or such other term as the 
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Commissioner may approve."3 Id. at 57 I 3; Bateman Depo. Ex. 2 at 
2-3. 
1. On or about December 8, 1986, Mr. Williams submitted 
an FHA Residential Loan Application to CSB at its Price, Utah, 
branch. Mr. Williams was seeking an FHA-insured loan to refinance 
his home. Record at 58 f 5. 
8. The Application was submitted to Ms. Wilkinson, 
the direct endorsement underwriter, for her approval, id. 1 4. 
9. In processing Mr. Williams7 loan application, CSB 
obtained a title report on Mr. Williams' property, which indicated 
that Mr. Williams had given his employer, Utah Power & Light Company 
("UP&L"), a second deed of trust on his property in the amount of 
$10,000. Id. at 58-59 t 6. 
10. After Ms. Wilkinson reviewed the UP&L note and trust 
deed, she determined, in the exercise of her authority and discre-
tion as a direct endorsement underwriter, that the second mortgage 
on Mr. Williams' property did not comply with the FHA requirements 
for secondary financing set out in Circular Letter 14-85, codified 
at 24 C.F.R. § 203.32(c)(4), because the balance under the note 
could become payable before ten years if (1) Mr. Williams sold or 
transferred the property, (2) he no longer occupied it as a prin-
cipal residence, (3) he was transferred by UP&L, or (4) his 
3 The term "Commissioner" refers to the Federal Housing 
Commissioner acting on behalf of the Secretary of HUD. See 24 
C.F.R. § 200.4(b). 
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employment with UP&L terminated. The UPSL trust deed was to remain 
as a second lien on the property if CSB granted the loan. Record 
at 59-60 1 7. 
11. Ms. Wilkinson then telephoned the Region VIII Field 
Office of HUD and was told that Williams' second mortgage did not 
comply with the balloon payment provisions of the FHA requirements. 
Id. at 35 I 9; Deposition of Harriet Wilkinson [hereinafter Wilkin-
son Depo.] at 27; Bateman Depo. at 24 & Ex. 6. 
12. CSB then notified Mr. Williams that his loan appli-
cation could not be processed for FHA mortgage insurance because 
it did not comply with the FHA secondary financing requirements. 
Record at 60-61 If 8 & 9. 
13. In his deposition, Mr. Bateman, the supervisory 
realty specialist at the Region VIII Field Office of HUD, who is 
in charge of supervising the underwriting of loan applications, 
testified that a direct endorsement underwriter would be within 
her authority and discretion in declining an application for an 
FHA-insured loan if a second mortgage like the UP&L mortgage on 
Mr. Williams' property existed. He further testified that, in 
his opinion as an FHA administrator, Ms. Wilkinson's interpretation 
of Circular Letter 14-85 was a fair interpretation. Bateman Depo. 
at 27. 
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ARGUMENT 
!• WILLIAMS HAS NOT SHOWN "SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT 
REASONS" FOR GRANTING REVIEW OF THE COURT OF 
APPEALS' ORDER, 
A party seeking review by writ of certiorari must show 
"special and important reasons" for granting review. R. Utah S. 
Ct. 43. The only reason for issuing a writ of certiorari that 
Williams offers is that the summary judgment entered by the trial 
court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals "is wrong-" Appellant's 
Petition for Writ of Cert- at 16- Review by writ of certiorari 
is generally reserved for those cases that present important and 
unsettled legal issues. A petitioner cannot meet his burden of 
justifying discretionary review simply by claiming that the lower 
courts, which fully considered his arguments and rejected them, 
were "wrong." The fact that a lower court may have made a mistake, 
without more, is not a sufficiently "special" or "important" reason 
for invoking this Court's jurisdiction. 
Even if a petitioner could obtain review by writ of cer-
tiorari simply by showing that the lower court was "wrong," review 
by certiorari is not justified in this case because the decisions 
of the lower courts were correct. Williams claims that the lower 
courts erred in three respects: (1) in finding that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact, (2) in concluding that the Bank 
was not negligent, and (3) in finding that the Bank had authority 
to reject Williams' application without referring it to HUD. Only 
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the last error is encompassed in Williams' statement of the ques-
tions presented for review, but since Williams devotes as much of 
his petition to the first two alleged errors as to the third, CSB 
will address each of these claims in turn.4 
II. THE LOWER COURTS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE 
WAS .NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT, 
Although not raised as an issue for this court's review, 
Williams disputes the trial court's conclusion (affirmed by the 
Court of Appeals) that summary judgment was appropriate because 
there was no genuine issue of material fact. 
The trial court correctly concluded that the material 
facts of this case were undisputed. Williams tried to create a 
factual dispute in the lower courts by arguing that Ms. Wilkinson's 
affidavit was inconsistent with her deposition testimony.5 in her 
affidavitr Ms. Wilkinson stated, in pertinent part, that she tele-
phoned the HUD regional office in Salt Lake City and that the "party 
who answered the telephone at the FHA Region [VIII] Office, verified 
that the secondary financing by Utah Power & Light on Mr. 
4 Williams also devotes one point of his argument to his 
claim that the loss of future interest savings is compensable. 
The question of whether or not the plaintiff had suffered a com-
pensable loss was never an issue in the courts below and was never 
ruled on. 
5
 CSB does not dispute point III of Williams' petition. 
It is simply irrelevant since, as shown below, Ms. Wilkinson's affi-
davit did not conflict with her deposition testimony in any material 
respect. 
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Williams [ ]|| property was ncd acceptable ujidei I'JLA guidelines. 
Record at 35 1 9. In her deposition, Ms- Wilkinson testified that 
she • 20i i tac ted H UD ti i I in ' I In ml I hnr'n hi nl IIHMII MM lun \\ i in 
procedures and circulars since Circular Letter 14-85 was issued. 
See Wilkinson Depo , at Li A «l ' , 
Ms • -li Ikinsori"' u statements in her atiidavit, and deposition 
are not inconsistent Although her purpose in calling HUD may 
hirivp bippii nif»H-*,ll,i i n I i in l ul ill MiNiiM h.ihil lu»f-Mi i in i y i l iduqi in l In 
FHA requirements, she *rab nevertheless told that Mir, Williams' 
secondary financing did not meet t IIP FHA conditions Mr Williams 
ignores Ma Wilknihun1 i ile^ u'iil.iuu Liibt union y in wliu In she stated, 
consistent with her affidavit, that she told HUD that Williams' 
o t h e r l oan i i l h ; » i | I i n h a l l o o n priymHiii i i | in, Mil ILLMUIJ \\f\ I n in ml 
Mi". W i l l i a m s ' empioyniient and was t o l d t ha i t h e s e c o n d a r y t i n a n c i n g 
would not upp t t h e FHA r e q u i r e m e n t s See W i l k i n s o n Depo, 
11 ' i iver . FI n/ L I i taut- . ^n -^ e^ j ^ . emar = d e p c s i •  i r 
t e s t i m o n y
 f In w h i c h h e c o n f i r m e d i m*-one r -ne fUD r e c j i o n -
o f f i : e t o 11 I IMI'I. i J n ,1 k i IIM III l in n!, • f j i ic ^ 
did not comply with the ten-year jcnairior - * regulat^ori 
Rateman Depo, at 24-25, Final! J r ^ a r - " ?.- , - manager ot 
Lhe Kegion VIII 0Lfii.ce, wrote i* ;t:orr^^ n 1 ultl and 
confirmed that "it was the opinion ot office rn^- Mr Williams' 
secondare/ f inane Lni;j <\ "inf I, LC ted - in I i In,,!! | , 
do have recollection of [so telli:r. ^ .Vinson; Bateman Dep(j 
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Ex. 6. None of this testimony was disputed, nor did the plaintiff 
point to anything in the record to show that HUD did not tell Ms. 
Wilkinson that Mr. Williams' secondary financing was unacceptable, 
as he was required to do under Rule 56(e). The only basis for 
Williams' claim of error is his inference that, because Ms. Wilkin-
son's purpose in calling HUD was to determine whether there had 
been any change in the applicable regulations, the subject of Mr. 
Williams' second mortgage must not have been discussed. However, 
that inference is refuted by the undisputed facts in the record 
that show that HUD did tell Ms. Wilkinson that it thought Mr. Wil-
liams' secondary financing was unacceptable. The plaintiff's bare 
assertion to the contrary simply does not raise a genuine issue 
of fact. 
III. THE LOWER COURTS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT CSB WAS 
NOT NEGLIGENT. 
Williams claims that the lower courts erred in concluding 
that CSB was not negligent. The lower courts correctly concluded 
that, as a matter of law, Williams had no claim against CSB for 
negligence. 
It is axiomatic that, to succeed on a negligence claim, 
the plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed him a duty 
of care and that the defendant breached that duty.^ Smalley v. 
6 CSB does not dispute Williams' second point V in his 
petition, namely, that a bank's duties are questions of law. CSB 
simply claims that there was no evidence that it breached its duty 
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Rio Grande W • Kv. Lu 'I III hi I ' I II I I I1 Ml I | I IUH | I in" 
owes i t s cus tomers a duty tn e x e r c i s e o r d i n a r y c a r e ii \w I n d u s , , 
Inc v 2 ions F i r s t Mat' I Bank, 7fi7 i>,2ci 93ri MIH 1111 ill 1988 1 
Assuming arguendo thcit .i Irjan a p p l i c a n t such a a Hi , i inl jai ikj i.a a 
"customer* of the bumi!* t h e r e is nimpLy no ev idence t h a t CSB f a i l e d 
111 e xe r i' i > H i iJ111a i $ ... 11 i i i m 11 HI in I I i J 111 111 I 111 m |.i |j I 11 i 
t i o n . As * ihfHt ' i e n d o r s e m e n t u n d e r w r i t e r , CSB had f u l l and tin -
c o n d i t i o n d l ami h e r i t.y t o a c t a s HUD"b a g e n t t o a p p r o v e i r d e c l x n e 
FHA a p p l i c a t i o n s w i t h o u t any p r i o r a p p r o v a l troni HUU oee Bateman 
Depo. a t II 1 - I B ; i d . Fix, ib Hi Bateman, t h e HUD Region VIT r 
Fi e l d Df I 11 a MiitpJ I^MI iiilliiii ii|iHry LII-MI ! In iinilei'wii il in \ I I MM .ii|np 
cations, testified thai: i direct endorsement underwriter would be 
within liei dacnor;:" ' * n^ref* • :e~3ir. * an rn^ appucdLic1, 
where a second no* - _;, .:uw: ie^ -
 fc . x.e XL.. Wi.. :a^<=' were presented 
and that i vei.e v~- a :±. nterpreratio - - r^ular 
t h a i Mi i 
IjjL JII J ' \eless Mr Wilkinson did contact HI . vas 
told that Mr W;".'rams' second ^ iiiidnLing was undceep"*-! -. 
None ot tl:. . --^i .inonv w»<* ^ f . . 
of care. Although claims of negligence ordinarily raise questions 
to be resolved by the trier of fact, where, as here, the relevant 
facts are undisputed and only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn 
from them, such questions become questions :t Law that the court: 
can resolve on summary judgment, Se<~ Webster v. Sill, 6 75 
P-2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). 
To establish a claim for negligence, the plaintiff must 
show unreasonable conduct on the part of the Bank. Noonan v. First 
Bank of Butte, 740 P.2d 631, 636 (Mont. 1987). And the undisputed 
testimony shows that CSB acted reasonably in handling and turning 
down Mr. Williams' application. Williams7 negligence claim there-
fore failed as a matter of law. 
IV. THE LOWER COURTS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT CSB DID 
NOT BREACH ANY DUTY IT OWED WILLIAMS BY NOT 
SUBMITTING HIS LOAN APPLICATION TO HUD. 
Unable to show that CSB acted unreasonably, Williams 
argues that CSB had a duty to submit his application to HUD for 
regular processing.7 He argues that the 1985 HUD regulations de-
prived the direct endorsement underwriter of her authority to 
approve applications where there was a balloon second mortgage. 
Williams reads too much into the HUD regulations. They 
do not deprive the direct endorsement underwriter of her authority 
and discretion to approve or reject applications for FHA-insured 
7
 Williams claims in point V of his petition that CSB's 
breach of this alleged duty gives rise to claims for both negligence 
and breach of contract. See Appellant's Petition for Writ of Cert, 
at 15-16. Apart from the fact that Williams asserted his breach 
of contract theory for the first time on appeal, point V of his 
petition is irrelevant. Both of plaintiff's theories are premised 
on the breach of the same duty—CSB's alleged duty to submit Wil-
liams' application to HUD. Because no such duty existed and because 
Williams was not hurt by any breach of the alleged duty, see infra 
part V, it does not matter whether he sufficiently alleged a claim 
for breach of contract. Williams' contract claim must stand or 
fall with his negligence claim, and, for the reasons discussed in 
parts III through V, the lower courts correctly concluded that 
Williams had no claim against CSB for negligence. 
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d e c i d e s nuL Lo seek the Commissioner ' s a p p r o v a l , thene La no duty 
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direct endorsemen, t underwriter had discretion to submit; the claiin 
to HUD or no t. The let ter states, 11: ai lender wishes to request 
a balloon term less than 10 years, the lender submits the case to 
the local FHA office just as with regular processing I i f ipe l lan t ' s 
Pet i t :i on f • :::: r Wri i: ::: f Cer t i ixui 1 1 yp II*! a 1 '" 1 (,•' n i p h a s 1 i:J n li l e i II | . 
Moreover, C i r c u l a r Le t t er 14 -85 s t a t e s , ""In only t hose r a r e cases 
where [d i r e c t endorsement] underwr i t.^rs nvt I l,y hes i fvi rp 11*r 'Vimm 1.1 
would we welcome t l le oppor tun i ty to accept; the a p p l i c a t i o n midei; 
r e g u l a r p rocess ing ,"" Bateman Depo, PX, ? a t '? 1 4 Under W i l l i a m s ' 
i IWTI Uieoij " 1 * I I lie < 'ii.se M. N t I kintaUN J ul nul liebitaHic JLJII conclud 1 ng 
l I'lia!" the IJP&L. Loan d id not meet FHA's secondary f i n a n c i n g r e q u i r e -
Tii- ' J - -
I s •-. *^ * - -+- r o u - - ^ ^ o r r p f t j v ^ n n c i ^ ' l e ^ ^ h a t CSB 
V. WILLIAMS WAS NOT INJURED BY CSB'S FAILURE TO SUBMIT 
HIS APPLICATION TO HUD. 
Even if CSB owed Williams a duty to submit his application 
to HUD, Williams was not hurt by any breach of that duty. Under 
the applicable procedure, if CSB had wanted to seek the Commis-
sioner's approval of Mr. Williams' secondary financing, it would 
have had to submit his application as with regular processing. 
Under regular processing, the loan application is submitted to 
the HUD field office having jurisdiction over the area where the 
property is located. In this case, that would be the Region VIII 
Field Office. The field office determines whether the application 
meets the eligibility requirements and either accepts or rejects 
the application. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.142 through 200.146. In 
this case, the field office determined that Mr. Williams' applica-
tion would not qualify for FHA insurance given his second mortgage 
with its balloon payment provision and so informed Ms. Wilkinson. 
See/ e.g., Bateman Depo. at 24 & ex. 6. Mr. Bateman testified 
that it was the consensus of the Region VIII Field Office at the 
time CSB was processing Mr. Williams' application that his secondary 
mortgage conflicted with the FHA requirements and that FHA "would 
not insure the loan if it were closed." Bateman Depo. at 35. 
Thus, even if CSB had submitted Mr. Williams' application for regu-
lar processing, at the time it would have been submitted the Region 
VIII Field Office would have rejected it. 
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W i l l i a m s makes much nl I lie tai L Lhat , in llililj, 1 he Hill 
R e g i o n V I I I F i e l d O f f i c e i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s loan \] \ I 
c i t i J! VMI u1 " | i I ii1 I I, i i I i ' i1 * " I.; ir.iin l e s p i U . ".J , .ec L -
dary f i n a n c i n g . See Record at- 1 0 8 - 0 9 ; Bateman Depo. ex I:K How-
e v e r , W i l l i a m s o v e r s t a t e s t h e r e g i o n of f i r e ' s p o s i t i o n , The r e q i ,ai 
o f f i c e n ie re ly cone Luded, a L I. sr inen'L i in,) '< i il I i Wil l i a m s c o u n s e l , 
r e v i e w i n g t h e UP&L l o a n document s and d i s c u s s i n g t h e m a t t e r w i t h 
i t s Wash i inqt i ii! iiiiilnrwr i t M I •« I thai ' "a,ir»ii ! In uiqlii I In i "i nt i i i . i^i l" 
by t h e b a l l o o n payment "was s t i l l in q u e s t i o n and not c l e a r l y r e -
s o l v e d , and r e p r e s e n t e d c o n s i d e r a b l e r i s k t o FHA and r o u l d j e o p a r -
d i s e [n i l , | Hi i"! I I 1 uiiiri il.il l i L y t o p e r l o n i i on I \\v FHA :i p o r t i o n
 r 
we d e c i d e d t o g i v e b e n e f i t of t h e d o u b t t o Mr* W i l l i a m s Bateman 
Dppu. MA ii «il I i i M u | IIM I i i .jdded i Mlivioi is ly , < 's H <n I Ii i I u nb , -
g a t i o n s as a d i r e c t e n d o r s e m e n t u n d e r w r i t e r t o t o i l o w t h e a p p l i c a b l e 
r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s , owed Mr. W i l l i a m s no d u t y t o q i v e him t h e 
b e n e n c ot iiiniy aouBt: ana wan no t n e g l i g e n t t o r t a i l i n g i.i i do s o . 
CONCLUSION 
W i l l l a m s ' c l a im t h a t t h e lower c o u r t s e r r e d i s b a s e d mi 
twe • prem ii s e s : (1! ) tl ta t CSB 1 la :::i a Ii i nl mi i l Hi i \yy I n a l i JII 
to 'HUD, and (2) tha t, if CSB had submitted fhe application to KUD, 
KUD won :t 1 :i have accepted it. As shown abovp UP it her prpmi-.i i 
true. Because CSB.'s mot ion for summary judgment was Jully in im-
ported by the record 'Llir burden shifted to Williams \ iP-t forth 
h'i. <'?-.' : : 1" \\ s h «" in 11 »,j I I in i,;i I l l ' h e i e n i n e l o ' i u o I i n I  j i j 1 " 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e)* Williams failed to meet this burden, and 
the lower courts correctly concluded that CSB was entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. But even if the lower courts were 
"wrong," as Williams claims, their alleged error does not present 
"special and important reasons" for this court to grant review of 
the Court of Appeals' decision. Williams' Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari should therefore be denied. 
DATED this 13t* day of September, 1989. 
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS, Esq. 
PAUL M. SIMMONS, Esq. 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendant West One 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 0 F S E R V I C E 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the attached Respondent's Brief i n Opposition to Petition for™ 
Wri t • ::: f Cei: t: 1 o r a r i l- ::: 1:  e ma 1 II e d t In i s B ' '"l| i hi y \ \ I ' l e p ! einbi-j1; I " I I 
postage prepaid, to: 
Samuel 1 i rig
 # Esq. 
Eric P. Hartman, Esq 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
2120 South 1300 East #301 
Salt Lake City, UT 34106 
^OAAL M' A^M^rv^ 
PS5.37 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 56- Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days firom the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party, A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing- and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of ill papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
§ 203-32 Mortgage lien. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in 
this section, a mortgagor must estab-
lish that, ifter the mortgage offered 
for insurance has been recorded, the 
mortgaged property will be free and 
clear of all liens other than such mort-
gage, and that there will not be out-
standing any other unpaid obligations 
contracted in connection with the 
mortgage transaction or the purchase 
of the mortgaged property, except ofr 
ligations that are secured by property 
or collateral owned by the mortgagor 
independently of the mortgaged prop-
erty 
(b) With prior approval of the Com-
missioner, the mortgaged property 
may be subject to a secondary mort-
gage or loan made or insured, or other 
secondary lien, held by a Federal, 
State, or local government agency or 
instrumentality provided that the re-
quired monthly payments under the 
insured mortgage and the secondary 
mortgage or lien shall not exceed the 
mortgagor's reasonable ability to pay 
as determined by the Commissioner 
(c) With the prior approval of the 
Commissioner, the mortgaged proper^  
ty may be subject to a second mort-
gage held by a mortgagee that is not a 
Federal, State or local governmental 
agency or instrumentality. Unless the 
mortgage is for the purpose described 
in paragraph (d) of this section, it 
shall meet the following requirements: 
(1) The required monthly payments 
under the insured mortgage and the 
second mortgage shall not exceed the 
mortgagor's reasonable ability to pay, 
as determined by the Commissioner: 
(2) Periodic payments, if any, shall 
be collected monthly and be substan-
tially the same; (3) The sum of the principal amount 
of the insured mortgage and the 
second mortgage shall not exceed the 
loan-to-value limitation applicable to 
the insured mortgage, and shall not 
exceed the maximum mortgage limit 
for the area; (4) The repayment terms shall not 
provide for a balloon payment before 
ten years, or for such other term as 
the Commissioner may approve, 
except that the mortgage may become 
due and payable on sale or refinancing 
of the secured property covered by the 
insured mortgage; and 
24 C.F.R. § 2 0 3 . 3 2 (1988) ( 
(5) The mortgage shall contain a 
provision permitting the mortgagor to 
prepay the mortgage m whole or in 
part at any time, and shall not provide 
for the payment of any charge on ac-
count of such prepayment. 
(d)(1) With the prior approval of the 
Commissioner, the mortgaged proper-
ty may be subject to a junior (second 
or third) mortgage securing the repay-
ment of funds advanced to reduce the 
mortgagor's monthly payments on the 
insured mortgage following the date it 
is insured, if the junior mortgage 
meets the following requirements: 
(1) The junior mortgage shall not 
provide for any payment of principal 
or interest until the property securing 
the junior mortgage is sold or the in-
sured mortgage is refinanced, at which 
time the junior mortgage shall become 
due and payable; 
(u) The total amount of repayments 
under the junior mortgage shall not 
exceed the least of: 
(A) One-half of the mortgagor's 
equity interest in the property at the 
time of sale or refinancing; 
(B) Three times the amount of funds 
advanced to effect the interest rate 
buy-down; or 
(C) The sum of the original loan 
amount plus the total accrued interest 
on the junior mortgage at the time of 
repayment; and 
(ui) The junior mortgage shall con-
tain a provision permitting the mort-
gagor to prepay the mortgage in whole 
or in part at any time, and shall not 
provide for the payment of any charge 
on account of such prepayment. Any 
full or partial prepayment will not be 
recoverable by the mortgagor if, by ap-
plication of paragraph (d)(l)(ii) on 
sale or refinancing of the property, a 
lesser amount than the amount pre-
paid would have been due. (2) The sum of the principal amount 
of the insured mortgage, any second 
mortgage made under paragraph (b) 
or (c) of this section, and the mortgage 
securing the repayment of funds ad-
vanced to reduce the borrower's 
monthly payments (whether a second 
or third mortgage) may exceed the 
loan-to-value limitation applicable to 
the insured mortgage, but such sum 
may not exceed the maximum mort-
gage limit for the area. 
[45 FR 19223, Mar 25, 1980, as amended at 
50 PR 20906. May 21, 19853 
.asis added) . 
